Showing posts with label web apps. Show all posts
Showing posts with label web apps. Show all posts

Adobe frees mobile flash: It's about time

Today Adobe announced a series of changes to its emerging web applications platform. The changes include:

--The next version of the mobile Flash runtime will be free of license fees. Adobe also confirmed that the mobile version of the Air runtime will be free.

--Adobe changed its licensing terms and released additional technical information that will make it easier for companies to create their own Flash-compatible products.

--The company announced a new consortium called Open Screen supporting the more open versions of Flash and Air. Members of the new group include the five leading handset companies, three mobile operators (including NTT DoCoMo and Verizon), technology vendors (including Intel, Cisco, and Qualcomm), and content companies (BBC, MTV, and NBC Universal). Google, Apple, and Microsoft are not members. It's not clear to me what the consortium members have actually agreed to do. My guess is it's mostly a political group.

Adobe said that the idea behind the announcements is to create a single consistent platform that lets developers create an application or piece of content once and run it across various types of devices and operating systems. That idea is very appealing to developers and content companies today. It was equally appealing two years ago, when then-CEO of Adobe Bruce Chizen made the exact same promise (link):

If we execute appropriately we will be the engagement platform, or the layer, on top of anything that has an LCD display, any computing device -- everything from a refrigerator to an automobile to a video game to a computer to a mobile phone.

If Adobe had made the Open Screen announcement two years ago, I think it could have caught Microsoft completely flat-footed, and Adobe might have been in a very powerful position by now. But by waiting two years, Adobe gave Microsoft advance warning and plenty of runway room to react -- so much so that ArsTechnica today called Adobe's announcement a reaction to Microsoft Silverlight (link).

Also, the most important changes appear to apply to the next version of mobile Flash and the upcoming mobile version of Air -- meaning this was in part a vaporware announcement. Even when the new runtime software ships, it will take a long time to get it integrated into mobile phones. So once again, Microsoft has a long runway to maneuver on.

Still, the changes Adobe made are very useful. There's no way Flash could have become ubiquitous in the mobile world while Adobe was still charging fees for it. The changes to the Flash license terms remove one of the biggest objections I've seen to Flash from open source advocates (link). The Flash community seems excited (link, link). And the list of supporters is impressive. Looking through the obligatory quotes attached to the Adobe release, two things stand out:

--Adobe got direct mentions of Air from ARM, Intel, SonyEricsson, Verizon, and Nokia (although Nokia promised only to explore Air, while it's on the record promising to bundle Silverlight mobile).

--The inclusion of NBC Universal in the announcement will have Adobe people chuckling because Microsoft signed up NBC to stream the Olympics online using Silverlight. So NBC is warning Microsoft not to take it for granted, and Adobe gets to stick its tongue out.


What does it all mean?

Nothing much in the short term. As I mentioned earlier, this is mostly a vaporware announcement (other than the license changes). Some people are speculating that this will put pressure on Apple to make Flash available on the iPhone (link). That's possible, if Apple's real concern was that they didn't like Flash Lite. Now they can port full Flash, or someone else can do it. But if Apple is in reality unwilling to let anyone else's platform run on the iPhone then we'll see other objections to Flash emerge.

The marketing competition to control the future of web apps is continuing to heat up. Microsoft is trying to take the whole thing proprietary by creating a comprehensive architecture, Adobe is trying to drive its own platform, Sun is trying to re-energize Java, Google is making its own moves, and so on (link). Plus, of course, most web app developers today are happy with what they're using now and have little interest in switching to any of the new architectures (check out the dandy commentary by Joel Spolsky here).

It's an enormously complex situation, and it's going to take months, if not years, before we can start to see who's winning and who is losing. Rubicon is working on a white paper that will try to clarify the situation a bit. I'll let you know when it's published.

In the meantime, enjoy the marketing fireworks. The intense competition is forcing companies to innovate faster and open up their products, as Adobe did today. I think that process is good for just about everyone in the industry.

Nokia, the OS company

Nokia bought Trolltech for about $150 million, and there's all sorts of speculation online about what it means. Before I get to that, let me quickly summarize what Trolltech does:

Trolltech is a Norwegian company that makes development tools and Linux software. Its best-known products are Qt (a software layer and development tools for writing applications that run across multiple operating systems, including Windows, Mac, and Linux), Qtopia (a user interface and applications layer for Linux), and Qtopia Phone Edition (a Linux software environment for mobile phones).

In the mobile world, Qtopia Phone Edition has been the company's best-known product, although it hasn't exactly been a commercial success. Motorola uses a version of Qt in its Linux mobile phones, but not all of Qtopia. The Sony Mylo mobile device uses Qtopia, as did the Sharp Zaurus PDAs. But Trolltech had so much trouble getting a mainstream phone licensee for Qtopia that it created its own hardware prototype, the Greenphone. (Out of fairness, I should add that Trolltech has a lot of other tiny licensees you've never heard of; you can see the full list here.)

The obvious assumption would be that Nokia bought Trolltech for its phone technology, but that's not what Nokia says. The company's press release says Trolltech will help advance its "cross-platform software strategy for mobile devices and desktop applications, and...Internet services business. With Trolltech, Nokia and third party developers will be able to develop applications that work in the Internet, across Nokia's device portfolio and on PCs."

All About Symbian reinforced that message, reproducing a slide from the Nokia press briefing that showed Qt layered on top of Nokia Series 40, S60, and a variety of desktop PC operating systems (link). The Guardian quoted a Nokia spokesperson as saying the emphasis of the deal is development tools: "This is about Trolltech's fantastic tools. You can much faster develop programmes which can work on multiple platforms." (link).

Vnunet quoted an analyst saying that Nokia will use Qtopia to help deploy its Ovi Internet services cross-platform (link). I don't really see the Internet connection; Qtopia has not been a contender in the net applications world the way that Flash and Silverlight are. But maybe Nokia wants to build it into a contender.

Other analysts suggested other motivations for the purchase. Some of the commentary on Slashdot suggested that Nokia is investing in Linux to counter Google Android (link). ArsTechnica suggested that Nokia might be planning to replace S60 with Qt (link), while others suggested that Nokia plans to use Linux instead of Symbian. Richard Windsor of Nomura pointed out in an e-mail analysis that the purchase of Qt rips the guts out of Motorola's Linux plans, although he guesses that's more of a happy side effect for Nokia than the primary motivation.

But an unsigned article on ZDNet UK had the most sweeping interpretation, basically saying that this spells certain death for all proprietary operating systems (link):

Nokia's bet is that the sheer size of the Qt 4-based market will be a decisive inducement for everyone else, handset makers, operators, and pure applications players alike, and that the explosion in compatibility will amplify the market for everyone much as happened on the desktop when MS-DOS anointed the PC architecture. But unlike then, Qt 4 will break forever the idea that one part of the market can seal itself off as a profitable mini-universe, an idea as archaic in the 21st century as the feudalism it so closely resembles.

As we say here in California, I want some of what he's been smoking.


What does it really mean?

We're all assuming that Nokia actually has a coherent master plan here. Although $150m is a lot of money to me personally, it's mouse nuts to Nokia. Maybe Nokia bought Trolltech just as an experiment, or to keep it from falling into some other company's hands. The fact that Nokia's going to continue to develop its Maemo version of Linux, which is not based on the Trolltech technology, suggests a certain amount of incoherence.

If you want to be really Machiavellian, you could speculate that this purchase is the Nokia mobile phone organization's answer to Maemo -- "you tablet guys keep your version of Linux, now we have our own."

But let's assume there really is a plan, and it's aimed at competitors. About six months ago, I wrote about Nokia's ambitions to be a computer company (link). Now we see them dealing themselves into the operating system competition as well. No matter what you think Nokia's motives are, the fact is that it's now the owner of a respectable cross-platform software layer that runs on PCs and mobile devices. Nokia is now a software layer company, in very direct competition with other layer companies like Microsoft and Adobe and Sun. The deal also makes Nokia a much more important player in the open source community. And it puts Nokia in more direct opposition to the companies with their own operating systems -- Apple and Google and (once again) Microsoft.

That's a huge potential change. I say "potential" because Nokia has a lot more to do if it really wants to compete. The Trolltech team will need more investment (they have been losing money) and Nokia has a lot of work to do in developer evangelism and support to make the challenge real. But the potential is there.

I think that as the implications of the deal become clear, Nokia may have trouble continuing to partner with some of its new competitors. For example, it has spent a lot of time positioning itself as a partner to Adobe Air, but it's hard to see the evolved Qt as anything other than a competitor. Same thing for Google.

As for how this fits with all of Nokia's other products, I'm having a lot of trouble understanding how Qt will cohabit with S60 and Series 40. What exactly are developers supposed to develop for, and which user interface will the phones feature? If Nokia tries to keep all of them going, its phone software is going to look like a petit four, with layers stacked on layers stacked on layers. That makes for a nice pastry, but in a mobile phone it's a recipe for bad performance and short battery life. It's also a certain way to confuse developers.

So a lot depends on Nokia's next steps. Does Qt replace Series 40 and S60? I don't know which group within Nokia made the Trolltech deal, but I wonder if the biggest competitive battle might end up being the one inside the company, between its competing software standards.

Who's really using web apps, and why?

In my work at Rubicon, we spend much of our time helping tech companies with strategy and product planning. One recurring theme is the impact of web applications. We help web app companies figure out their customers and product plans, and we help traditional tech companies understand web apps and what to do about them.

As we do this work, we repeatedly run into a lack of basic information about how web apps are being used -- how many people use them, who uses them, which apps they use, and so on. There's a lot of anecdotal information from individual web companies on how they're doing, but almost nothing on the usage of web apps across the industry as a whole.

So we decided to fill that hole. This summer we did a survey of about 2,000 US adult PC owners on their usage of web applications. We released the results this morning at the AjaxWorld conference. Some highlights:

--37% of US home PC owners use at least one web application on a regular basis. Usage has already spread far beyond early adopters.

--Usage varies dramatically by app category. E-mail and games are the two most popular web app categories, but some other categories (such as online word processing) have very low adoption so far.

--College students are more enthusiastic adopters of web apps than non-students. More than 50% of college students use at least one web app regularly.

To me, the study was a good reminder of the practicality of most PC users. Although we in the industry worry a lot about the technical distinctions between things like web apps and packaged applications, most users don't care. They just want to solve their problems and get on with their lives. If a web app is better or cheaper than a packaged app, they will use it. If it isn't better in some way, they won't.

If you're working at a web app company and want to create a popular service, be sure you solve a real world problem that people care about. The doors are wide open if you do that.

If you work at a traditional software company and think you're immune to competition from web apps, or that it'll take years for them to affect you, you're living in fantasyland. For about 70% of US PC owners, there are no significant barriers to adoption of web apps.

There's a lot more analysis (and graphs of the findings) in the full report on the Rubicon website. Check it out here.

And there's some interesting commentary about the study here and here and here and here.

The war between Nokia and Apple

"When two elephants fight, the loser is the jungle." --Ancient proverb

And so it begins.

The Apple-Nokia war finally got underway on August 29, when Nokia announced an array of new music-capable phones and an online music store. The two companies had been eyeing one-another like wrestlers outside the ring for more than a year. Apple entered the mobile phone market, but only in the US, where Nokia is a non-factor. Nokia openly declared that it's a computing company (link), but its non-phone products so far have been different flavors of lame.

But the August 29 announcements put Nokia and Apple on a path to direct confrontation. I haven't seen a lot written online about the importance of this conflict. I think that's probably because many of the people who follow Apple's business closely are based in the US and have trouble taking Nokia seriously because it's a secondary player here. Meanwhile, Nokia's most ardent followers are in Europe, and look at Nokia's actions in light of its regional conflicts with SonyEricsson and the European mobile operators.

But when you stand back and look at what's happening in the industry worldwide, it's clear that Apple and Nokia both want very badly to be the dominant mobile computing company for young adults. That makes a huge, relentless conflict between them inevitable. They're like two armies trying to take the same hill. One's coming from the west, the other from the east, so there's not a lot of fighting at the moment. But as soon as they reach the hill, there's going to be an explosion.

I don't know who will win, but I'm pretty sure that the main losers will be all of the other device companies and mobile operators who happen to be hanging around on the hill.

My advice to them: Run.


What Nokia announced, and why it matters

On the 29th, Nokia announced four phones, two new data services for its phones, and a new brand. Let's start with the services.

The Nokia Music Store is just what the name says, an online music store run by Nokia. It'll be accessible by both PC and selected Nokia phones. The N81 and N95 will be able to talk to the store directly, while for a number of other Nokia phones you'll be able to buy music on your PC and sync it to your phone (Nokia calls this process "sideloading").

Nokia will offer more purchase options than iTunes does. You can either buy and download individual titles (for one euro a song, a euro cent above iTunes), or you can subscribe to the store and stream all the music you want to your PC (but not save it) for ten euros a month.

Nokia positions the streaming service as a way to discover new tunes, after which you're supposed to buy and download the ones you want to keep. I can understand the practical reasons for not streaming from the store directly to phones -- there would be issues with data charges, network capacity, latency, and so on. But I don't know how users will feel about that. If I had a streaming account on my PC, I think I'd expect to have the same service on my Nokia phone. And why wouldn't you want to discover new music while you're on the go?

The bigger problem is that the 120 euros you pay a year for a streaming service is 120 songs you could have bought and kept forever. That's one new song every three days. For comparison, the average iTunes user buys three songs a month. A music subscription service is a great way to get access to a lot of music quickly, but unless you want a colossally large music collection, it's a huge financial drain in the long run (I wrote more on the economics of it here). No wonder the music industry loves the idea of subscriptions (link).

The re- rebirth of nGage. The other new service Nokia announced was a mobile game store. You'll be able to try games for free on your Nokia mobile or PC, and then after purchase you can use them on the PC or sync them to your phone (curiously, Nokia calls this process "installation.") Nokia also promises multiplayer and community features.

Price per game will be six to ten euros, and Nokia says you'll be able to pay by credit card or through your phone bill if the operator enables that. No word on what the revenue split is.

The service sounds pretty interesting to me. The most confusing thing about it is the name. The nGage service won't work with all of Nokia's N-series phones. I know there's no official tie between N-series and nGage (the names were apparently chosen separately), but try explaining that to a typical customer in a store. Nokia has struggled and failed for years to explain to customers the S60 platform that it uses in a lot of its phones; picture adding yet another layer of confusion on top of that (link).

I think the other important challenge to nGage is flash. There's a huge supply of free flash-based games on the web, and a lot of them are the sort of quick-reward, easy to use games that seem to do well on mobile devices. The biggest barrier to using them on mobiles is that Adobe charges for the mobile flash player, and so relatively few mobile phones have it installed. A small installed base of phones means that most developers don't target mobile flash. If Adobe ever drops the charge for the flash player, or if a free flash-equivalent comes along (perhaps a mobile version of Microsoft Silverlight), it might become very difficult to convince people to pay for nGage games.

I know nGage provides a higher-quality gaming experience than flash, but I'm not sure most mobile users will care enough to pay.

Ovi is a new brand that Nokia will use as a wrapper for all of its mobile services, including games, music, maps, photo sharing, and presumably more to come (link). I guess that makes sense from a convenience standpoint -- there will be one website (ovi.com) where you can go to discover all of the Nokia services (Nokia employees say that it will also be a gateway to the services of other companies as well ). Unfortunately, Ovi apparently won't work as a compatibility mark: the phones that can use one Ovi service can't necessarily use another. For example, many of the phones that can run nGage games can't directly connect to the music service. A brand is most effective when it represents a coherent idea or consistent product. I think Ovi creates an expectation of coherence but doesn't deliver it. It just says that Nokia's in the service business, which Nokia cares about but is not something that concerns users

If Nokia doesn't make all the Ovi services work on all its data-capable phones quickly, I think the varied incompatibilities between the Nokia services and devices are going to be a nightmare to explain at retail.

The four new phones
The N95 8GB adds more memory to Nokia's flagship Swiss army knife phone, which includes a 5 mp camera, improved 3G, WiFi, and GPS. This is the one that online reviewers always compare to the iPhone. It works with both nGage and the music store, and its base price is 580 euros before subsidy.
The N81 is a slider phone with WiFi and 3G, and has dedicated buttons to access both nGage and the music store. It'll sell for 430 euros pre-subsidy.
The 5310 is a slimline candybar phone that can play music synced from the Nokia music store. It cannot access the music store directly. It has dedicated music controls next to the screen, and its base price is 225 euros.
The 5610 is similar to the 5310, but adds a slider and built-in camera. Its base price is 300 euros. A lot of online reviewers have been comparing this and the 5310 to the SonyEricsson Walkman phones, and I think that was probably Nokia's thinking. But hold that thought because it's not necessarily how things will work out.

What's the impact? A huge amount depends on execution. How well will Nokia's new services integrate with the phones? How easy will it be to play songs and games? How many titles will be in the Nokia stores, and how good will they be? Services and mobile devices often live or die on the little details of usability, and we can't judge that for Nokia yet because we can't play with the new products and services.

But Nokia's direction is very clear. It wants to be in the mobile Internet services business, as both a developer and publisher of content and services. It's going to tie those services directly to its phones. And knowing Nokia, it'll keep iterating on both the phones and the services until it gets them right.

That's why Apple and Nokia are now at war. Even if Nokia's current products turn out to be lame, it's going straight into the territory that Apple has been pursuing ever since the first iPod shipped.

Apple's new products. I should add a little context on Apple's recent product announcements. In September, Apple made a lot of changes to the iTunes and iPod lineup. The move that got the most attention was the price cut of the iPhone from $599 to $399. I'll write more about that below. The other changes that stood out to me were:
--iTunes can now be accessed via WiFi on the iPhone and iPod Touch. This corrects a glaring weakness in the original iPhone. It's interesting that Apple apparently hasn't enabled the iPhone to talk to the store over a cellular connection. That may be because the network the iPhone uses in the US is too slow to easily download music, or it may be that AT&T doesn't want a lot of data traffic going over its network when the phone's data plan is flat-rate.
--The video version of the Nano, starting at $199, is a heck of a lot of technology in a very cute little package.
--The iPod Touch is basically an iPhone without the microphone and cellular radio. It makes a really interesting PDA for people who want to buy a basic voice phone and carry their entertainment separately. It's priced at $299.

(As an aside, I have a request: Once the iPod Touch starts selling like gangbusters, would someone please go find the person at Sony who decided the Clie handheld business was a dead end, and kick them in the shins?)


Relative strengths of the competitors

Or, how to piss off both Apple fans and Nokia fans in the same post.

Apple and Nokia are very different companies. Here are their relative strengths:



Resources. No contest. Although Apple is a very successful company, Nokia has vastly more financial resources.

Logistics. Nokia is one of the greatest logistics companies on the planet. It churns out hundreds of millions of phones, changes models frequently, and almost everything works properly. If Nokia were running the US Federal Emergency Management Agency, New Orleans would be 20 feet above sea level by now. Apple, by contrast, does a very competent job of managing contract manufacturers in Asia. Advantage Nokia.

Telephony experience. Another huge Nokia advantage. Designing phones and getting them qualified on networks is really tricky, and Nokia knows how to do it better than anyone else.

System design skill. This is Apple's core competence; it knows how to design hardware and software together to create a beautifully integrated system. Nokia's phones often appear as if their hardware and software were designed by completely different groups and slapped together at the last minute (because, in many cases, that's exactly what happened). This works great in commodity phones, but if the competition is for who can create the most elegant data experience, Nokia is at a huge disadvantage.

Brand power. Wow, this is a tough one. Apple has one of the coolest brands on the planet. Nokia's brand is beloved in Europe, and in most of the world it personifies upward mobility (except in the US and Japan). I call this one a tie.

User interface. Apple knows how to design these. The kindest thing you can say about Nokia's interface designs is that they're better than many other phone manufacturers. But that's like comparing a three-legged dog to a two-legged dog. Nokia's trying to get better -- at the announcement event, it showed video of a forthcoming device with an iPhone-style touchscreen (link). But for now, this one's clearly a strong Apple advantage.

Cleverness. Hey, it's Steve. Nokia's management is extremely smart, but you look to them for great operational execution, not brilliant strategy. After all, this is the company that brought us the original nGage.

Industrial design. I'm going to get flamed by the Nokia fans for this, but Apple has a clear advantage in design. The comparison: Nokia sometimes creates a great design. Apple rarely creates anything less than a great design.

Music solution. You'd think this would be an overwhelming advantage for Apple, but its arrogant handling of the music companies has made them even more desperate to tear Steve Jobs' throat out. They're anxious to work with someone like Nokia. Apple still has an advantage, but it has opened the door to competitors more than it had to.

Breadth. Nokia can fight on more fronts, and might be able to outflank Apple. For instance, Nokia's revived nGage game service gives it a second interesting offering for young people, whereas Apple is limited to just music and video. This is why I think Apple's decision not to open the iPhone to third party app developers is a huge mistake. If Apple had the help of third party developers, it could more easily fill out its software portfolio.


How they'll fight

Nokia wants a war of attrition. It will try to force Apple to compete on more fronts than it can afford to cover. I think we should expect to see a broad array of services added to Ovi quickly, aimed at enticing young adults in all sorts of different ways. Nokia will probably also launch a blizzard of media and entertainment phones with varied features, in the hope that a couple of them will hit sweet spots in the market.

Apple's game is to keep Nokia off balance and grab the most important opportunities. Think of a fencing expert: dodge, feint, and then stab the other guy in the heart. Apple currently has a product advantage -- its music service is already working. So it will try to capture as many customers as it can before Nokia gets its act together.

Apple can also use Nokia's size against it. Nokia has a huge product line and has to position each product carefully within it. Apple has only one phone, so it doesn't have much to protect. That's where the iPhone price cut comes in. The iPhone had been positioned against the n95, at the top of Nokia's product line. With the price cut, the iPhone is now looks much closer to the middle of Nokia's line, the phones that were supposed to be aimed at SonyEricsson.* Nokia can't slash the pricing of the n95 without screwing up the prices of its entire line, so with one price action Apple accomplished two things -- it can reach a lot more customers, and it forced Nokia to go back and rethink its competitiveness.

We should expect more surprise moves from Apple. It's more important for them to keep Nokia off balance than it is to please every customer. I think that's why Apple was willing to piss off the iPhone loyalists with a sudden, large price cut.

*Because of varying subsidies, it's hard to tell what the actual street price comparison between the new n95 and iPhone will be. The current n95 sometimes gets subsidized down by several hundred dollars if you buy a multiyear service contract. Maybe the new n95 will be subsidized down below iPhone prices. Maybe the iPhone will be subsidized too. Or maybe now that Nokia's offering its own services the operators will refuse to keep subsidizing the n95. We need to wait until the iPhone and Nokia's new services premiere in Europe this fall.


Impacts of the war: Alas, the innocent bystanders

The common denominator between Apple and Nokia is the imperative to move quickly. Nokia wants to broaden the competition fast, Apple wants to keep surprising Nokia with new features, products, and other changes. That's going to accelerate the pace of change in the mobile industry. And the accelerating pace of change, rather than anything in particular that Apple or Nokia have done today, is the biggest challenge to the rest of the industry. The other players have been struggling to keep up with the current rate of change; what will they do when Apple and Nokia step on the gas?

I've seen these situations before. You think you're just about keeping up with a competitor, and suddenly they disappear in a cloud of dust. I believe that's about to happen in mobile phones.

A shift from hardware design to systems design. Let's look at which companies have been most successful in smartphones: RIM creates e-mail phone systems that combine hardware, software, and services. DoCoMo and the other Japanese operators drive systems designs that combine hardware, software, and services. The iPhone does the same. Previously, those competitors were confined to particular countries or relatively small vertical markets, but now the world's biggest phone company is trying to do the same thing. That raises the competitive bar for everyone else in the industry.

What are companies like Samsung and Motorola supposed to do? They don't know how to create their own services, let alone integrate one well with a phone. In the music market, there are a lot of third party services out there, but none of them have been effective so far at challenging iTunes. I think they're not strong enough to change the competitive situation. Same thing for the operator services.

So the music phone market looks ugly. What's worse, if Nokia and the systems companies extend their new design approach to other data markets, the traditional mobile phone companies might be cut out of most of the big growth opportunities. They need to learn a new set of skills instantly, and they're far behind the curve.

The interesting potential exception to this situation is SonyEricsson, the leading vendor of music-enabled phones in Europe. Their hardware's nice, and they have a clean user interface that looks inspired by the iPod. Because I'm in the US, I don't have a good read on how smoothly the SonyEricsson phones integrate with operator and third party music stores. Is the experience as easy as using iTunes?

The Register says that Omnifone's Music Station is a promising possibility (link), but it's a subscription service costing 3 euros ($4.11) per week. For that same price you could buy 216 songs on iTunes per year, and at the end of the year you'd actually own something.

I really have trouble seeing the long-term economic benefit of a music subscription service for a user. If you subscribe to one, please post a comment and educate me.

SonyEricsson's management hinted to Time Magazine that it may create its own music service (link). If so, it had better hurry up. I have a lot of respect for SonyEricsson's hardware designs, but if it's limited to music stores with weird business models and ones that don't integrate seamlessly with its phones, it's going to have a very hard time outcompeting an accelerating Apple and a Nokia that's learning to integrate solutions.

Microsoft: Reverse course, again. This is the situation in which Microsoft could have stepped in to offer a music service to the phone companies challenged by Nokia. But in an exquisitely ironic move, Microsoft basically shot its licensed music store initiative last year in order to support the proprietary Zune. Now it can't step up to the opportunity.

Oops.

Microsoft is probably too late to recover in music, but as Nokia adds new services there should be a lot of opportunities to license equivalents of them to Nokia's competitors. Microsoft should focus less on selling its own OS, which scares the phone companies, and more on delivering services they can build into their phones.

And oh by the way, it's time to bury Zune. The iPod Touch just lapped it. If Microsoft wants to lose money on proprietary hardware, it should focus on Xbox. At least there it's buying market share for its money.

The operators lose control. They were struggling to establish their own services suites back when things were moving slowly. Now that Apple and Nokia are shifting into high gear, I don't see how the operators can keep up.

You can find very different scenarios online for where this will lead. Andrew at the Register predicts that the operators may strangle Ovi by refusing to sell any phones that support it (link). He has a good quote from someone who knows both Nokia and the operators:

The operators own the relationship with the customer. They're not going to allow Nokia to own it.

On the other hand, Richard Windsor, the excellent telecom analyst working for Nomura Securities in London, said in an e-mail brief that the operators are doomed:

Through their inaction, mobile operators have squandered the opportunity to be the service integrator for mobile and are left with the prospect of offering nothing to users except commodity data packets.

Who will be right? It depends on Nokia's ability to generate user demand for its services. If the users want the services, the operators will have to go along with it. I assume Nokia understands this and is prepared to do a big marketing push. Unlike Nokia's previous efforts to set up content portals, this time it has to succeed or it surrenders the future to Apple. So the conflict with Apple also locks Nokia into a war with the operators.

Isn't this fun?

If I were running a mobile operator, I'd stop trying to create my own services bundle, and focus on enabling as many Internet companies as possible to deliver services on my network, in exchange for a small cut of their revenue. An operator with the innovation of the open Internet behind it might be able to keep up with Nokia and Apple. But an operator working alone will be very lonely indeed.

What does it mean for users? You'd think that all this new competition would be good for users, and in many ways I'm sure it will be. But Apple and Nokia are both showing a disturbing tendency to keep everything proprietary. The iPhone is not open to third party developers, and at this point Ovi appears to be about marketing Nokia services, not opening up the richness of the Internet. (To be fair, Nokia employees say that will change, but I'm not sure if they mean that they'll offer access to any Internet service, or just to some selected ones that they cut a deal with. I suspect it'll be the latter.)

Welcome our new Apple and Nokia overlords. There's a disturbing possibility that we may end up exchanging one set of walled gardens for another. They'll be lavish, beautiful gardens, far better than the operators' truck farms for data. But we may not get the open data marketplaces that a lot of people have been hoping for.

If you want to read other perspectives on Nokia vs. Apple, check these out:
-A confident view from Finland (link)

-A cautious view from Jupiter Research (link)

-An outstanding article by Mark Halper at Time, with quotes from Nokia and SonyEricsson (link).

Impact of Amazon Flexible Payments Service: Computing as a utility

The announcement of Amazon FPS made my whole week, on a lot of different levels. I'm excited about the service itself, I'm excited about what it means for the development of web applications, and I'm excited about what it'll eventually do for the mobile data world.

Okay, I'm just excited.

About FPS. Before I talk about what it means, I should give a quick overview of what it is. FPS is a web service, meaning it's a set of online APIs that the creator of a website or web application can use to perform tasks. What FPS does for you is billing -- you can use it to accept payments for something you sell online. Basically, you transmit the customer's info to Amazon, and they take care of the credit check, credit card processing, billing, and so on. They send you the money, less a percentage cut that they take.

That's not at all revolutionary. PayPal and Google Checkout offer the same thing already. Amazon's cut is about the same as PayPal -- about 2% to 3% of your revenue, depending on the amount of business you do, plus 30 cents per transaction. Google is a tad cheaper, plus you get AdSense credits for using it.

(For more information on FPS, there are good articles here and here).

What impressed me about FPS is its flexibility. Amazon says you can set different payment terms for every customer, set up subscriptions and multiple payment schedules, manage a store in which you pass payments from a customer to your suppliers, set up either pre- or post-payment systems, and most importantly you can manage micropayments down to a couple of pennies per transactions (link).

The competing systems either don't offer this at all, or do it badly. I think FPS is a really important change to the competitive situation in payment services. And, because the payment services are all available to any website, that means it's an important change to the whole web platform.

New forms of online business. So far, e-commerce online has been limited mostly to selling things that we could already get through regular stores -- books, clothing, software, etc. One of the main culprits for this was payments. The current credit card system, with its strong discouragement of small transactions, makes it very hard to sell anything priced below a few dollars online. I think the most interesting use of online commerce will be the creation of markets for things that we can't buy through stores today. Most of those things are intellectual property of various sorts, and the natural market for them is a buck or less a copy. So the payment system is a big barrier.

I won't recap my whole argument for minipayments; I wrote about it recently, and you can read it here. Minipayments have already changed the world in music, where Apple's proprietary minipayment system in iTunes has revived the market for music singles, something that was virtually dead in stores. Another example: iStockPhoto has created a market for low-cost stock photography. By creating an easy system of practical minipayments, Amazon FPS will help to enable the creation of lots of iTunes and iStockPhoto equivalents for other products and forms of intellectual property. Think short stories, art, games, and probably a lot of other things we haven't even thought of yet.

I know FPS isn't perfect -- for example, small payments have to be aggregated and then billed in a single larger transaction. But it advances the state of the art dramatically, and more importantly it challenges Google and PayPal to improve their own minipayment handling. That competitive dynamic should eventually result in a truly great minipayment mechanism online, no matter who makes it.

Amazon vs. Google: A contrast in strategies. I think Amazon's approach to web services makes Google look bad. Both companies are taking on PayPal, but Google's approach so far has been pure blunt force -- duplicate PayPal's features, underprice them a bit, and tie it to another Google product (you get AdSense credits for using Google Checkout). Let's see...you compete by duplicating someone else's features, underpricing, and tying back to your dominant product. Does that remind you of a certain company in Redmond?

In contrast, Amazon has been trying to find holes in the infrastructure that nobody has filled yet. Its storage and compute services provided very important infrastructure that helped accelerate the growth of Web 2.0 companies. Although its payment system is not as unique, the emphasis on minipayments is, and I think it too will play an important part in the online ecosystem.

Bottom line: Google is often copying, Amazon innovating. I'd say that I'm disappointed in Google, but actually given their size they would crush everyone else if they were also innovative. So maybe we should be grateful.

What will Amazon do next? Their pattern is clear -- they're picking out things that they know how to do well (because of their retail operation) and turning them into services for other developers. A logical next step would be if they offered developers the infrastructure needed to set up an online store -- order tracking, support request tracking, inventory, displaying merchandise, etc. That would work with their other services, and would put them in a position to start draining business from eBay.

I'd also love to see them offer some sort of unified product and content discovery system. One of the things missing from the online ecosystem is an easy way to find goods and services that are for sale online, and comparison shop between them. You can use search for it, but it's not very well organized, and comparisons are difficult. eBay kind of does that, but you have to be registered as one of their sellers, and eBay does the billing. I'd love to see a looser directory than eBay that doesn't take the payments directly, but just points you to things you can buy.

That's what I thought Google Base would evolve into, but Google hasn't made the move yet, so there's still time for Amazon to seize that territory.

What it means for mobile. You can probably guess what I'm going to say here. The operators consistently charge up to about 50% of revenue for any songs, games, or other content sold through their networks. The mobile software stores like Motricity and Handango charge about the same. Amazon, Google, and PayPal each take about 2-3% of revenue, and that cost is likely to decline due to competition. As the wireless Internet takes hold, how many users will be willing to pay 50% extra just for the pleasure of having a game appear on their Sprint or Verizon bill rather than their Amazon bill?

If an operator bit the bullet now and priced competitively, they might be able to hold onto about 10% of revenue in exchange for the greater convenience of running content purchases through the mobile bill. But a 50% cut is like waving a red flag in front of a bull. There's no way Amazon and friends will be able to resist the temptation to target the mobile web. The question is not if, it's when.

The name of the game is infrastructure. In an open, decentralized computing environment like the Web, the best way for a software company to succeed is to create a control point -- to offer a piece of critical infrastructure that others need, and build a franchise around it.

Google understood that concept with search + advertising, and did well with maps, but has been remarkably inept at creating other strong points. I think that's because, to be blunt, engineering PhDs don't necessarily make the best business strategists. Google, if you want to go to the next level, ya got to hire business people who are as smart as your technical people. And you have to give them some authority.

Microsoft seems to get it, but is still trying to retrofit its applications into services rather than really thinking through what's needed in an online ecosystem. Apple seems to understand, but so far hasn't been interested in opening up its services to others (it could easily have turned iTunes into a content discovery and billing service, long before either Google or Amazon hit the market). Some other big Internet companies, like Yahoo, don't seem to really understand yet that this is the competitive battleground of their future.

Amazon is the one major web company that seems to both understand the situation, and be able to consistently come up with good new services. They already have two strong points (computing services and storage), and payments looks to be the third. If some of the other players don't wake up soon, Amazon's going to end up in an extremely powerful position online.

What we're learning from Web apps, part 3: Breeding new types of media

The argument over the viability of Web 2.0 applications misses the point -- most of the applications on any new computing platform die. What matters are the innovations and new business models that we learn from them (link).

Last time in this series I discussed what we're learning from Web 2 about managing a community online (link). This time I want to talk about the role the Internet is playing in the creation of new forms of media.


Is the internet a new medium?

I should start with a definition of what a medium is. Webster calls it, "a channel or system of communication, information, or entertainment" (link). I want to build on that a little. To me, a medium is something that moves information and/or entertainment between people. Movies are a medium, newspapers are a medium, oil painting is a medium. So is the telephone call, when you think about it. Each medium has its own distinct usages, economic model, and audience.

A lot of people have written about the Internet and/or the Web as a new "medium." A quick online search will give you thousands of articles and weblog posts on the subject. But there's something funny about the articles -- although they all call the Internet a medium, they define that medium in many different ways. For example...

--The Internet is a medium for mixed-media communication.
--It's a medium for online music broadcasting.
--It's a medium for making politically-motivated attacks. (And an unregulated medium at that. Heaven forbid we should practice unregulated politics.)
--It's "a perfect medium for the sale of software and other digital products."
--It's a medium for interactive, moving content.
--It's a "new medium for business communication."
--It's "a medium of news dissemination."
--It's "a new medium for design."
--It's a new medium for video.
--It's a new medium for communication by individuals.
--It's a new medium for socializing.

I think that in reality the Internet is not a new medium for anything. It's a transport mechanism. It is to data what a road is to eighteen-wheel trucks. And the Web isn't a medium either; it's a set of protocols for accessing and delivering data. To abuse the road analogy, it's the warehouses and truck stops that load, unload, and service the trucks.


The Internet is a meta-medium

When we talk about the Internet as a medium, we're confusing the delivery mechanism with the goods being delivered. This is a crucial distinction, because if you think of the Internet as a medium you won't understand its real power. The Internet is a meta-medium. It's a medium for creating new types of media; a general-purpose mechanism that spews new media as quickly as people can think them up.

And spew it does. As I hope you know if you've been reading this weblog for a while, I am not a fan of hype and overblown predictions. But I think the evidence shows that the Internet is enabling an explosion of new forms of media at a faster rate than ever before in human history. I believe this is one of the most revolutionary effects of the Internet, but we're so close to it that we don't think about it much.


Freeing media from the distribution mechanism

In the past, each new form of media was generally tied to a unique distribution infrastructure, technology base, and economic model. For a new medium to arise, you generally had to create a whole new production and distribution mechanism for it. For example:

Novels required the development of the printing press, a distribution infrastructure consisting of publishers and bookstores, and an economic model in which the reader pays and revenue is shared with the publisher and distribution chain.

Radio serial drama required the invention and sale of millions of radios, the construction of studios and transmitters, the creation of production companies and networks, and an economic model in which advertisers paid for the programs.

Movies required not just the creation of motion picture cameras, but also studios to produce the films, modified theaters to show them, a distribution system to deliver the reels of film, and an economic model in which ticket revenue and in-theater food sales combined to pay for the whole thing.

The huge effort and investment involved in creating these distribution chains severely limited the growth of new forms of media. For example, it took about 20 years from the invention of television and movies until either of them reached broad commercial distribution.

In contrast, new media proliferate on the Internet as fast as people can visit new websites and install plug-ins. (Obviously, this applies only to media that can be distributed electronically. But that still covers a lot.)

This chart gives you an idea of how the pace of change has accelerated.


This chart was based in part on a fantastic media history here.

Some people would say that most of the Internet media types I listed on the right edge of the chart aren't actually new media; that they're just a tweak on existing media. For example, Henry Jenkins argued in a great article for MIT Technology Review that you have to differentiate between media, genres, and delivery technologies (link):

Recorded sound is a medium. Radio drama is a genre. CDs, MP3 files and eight-track cassettes are delivery technologies. Genres and delivery technologies come and go, but media persist as layers within an ever more complicated information and entertainment system.

I think he's right from the perspective of classifying things analytically, but if you follow that thinking religiously then it's almost impossible to create a new medium any more, unless smell-o-vision or machine telepathy comes along. I think in practical terms, you have a new medium as soon as you create a substantially different set of audience and business dynamics, because those are the changes that create meaningful new economic opportunities for creative people and businesses.

Here's the test: if you can't take material created for some other medium and replay it unchanged, then I think you've invented a new medium. CDs were not a new medium because they were created and sold in the same way, to the same people, as vinyl LPs. But radio drama was a new medium, because it had its own distinct audience and rules. You couldn't just take a stage play and turn it into a radio drama unmodified.

By this standard, the Internet is spawning new media forms faster than bunnies breed in Australia.

Of course, not all of these new types of media will be successful long-term. But it's exciting to see so much experimentation happening so quickly, and I believe it will have a profound effect on the ways we communicate and entertain ourselves in the years to come.


The revolution in front of you

Okay, so that's the theoretical foundation on what's happening. Let's discuss some examples -- three new forms of media we're creating, the rules and opportunities they create, and what comes next.


Online video

Oh, man. This one's so complex that you could write a book on it. The term "video" includes a huge variety of different things -- music videos, TV shows, animation, movies, video clips from amateurs, even commercials. Each one appears to have a different online audience and different financials.

Some of them have already run through a cycle of excitement and disappointment. For example, some people speak of an "internet animation era" that came and went at the start of the decade (you can read more about the expectations here). Usually the culprit for the disappointment is the failure to find a sustainable business model.

The hottest area in online video today is obviously short clips like the ones you see on YouTube. The ironic thing is that this form of video had virtually no traction prior to the Internet. Meanwhile, movies and TV shows -- which everyone predicted would move onto the Internet quickly -- don't have nearly as much momentum online.

Why YouTube is successful. Using YouTube is like eating potato chips ("crisps" if you live in the UK). When you're bored, it's great to browse short video clips looking for things that are funny or amazing or just plain weird. The brilliant aspects of YouTube (in my opinion) are that the video loads fast (can you imagine eating potato chips if you had to unwrap every chip individually?), and that the YouTube site links you to lots of other related videos, so it's easy to wander. If one video is boring, you're only moments away from something else.

This instant gratification factor turns the rules of traditional video on its head. In traditional video, quality and an immersive experience are king. To suck people into a television program or a movie, you use incredibly high quality images, editing, and sound. (If you want to know how important this is, look at all the enormous amounts of money the industry is spending to move to high-definition broadcasting and higher-capacity DVDs.)

That's why short online video is a different medium. Rather than immersion, the goal is instant gratification.

But how do you make money? The problem with short online video is that no one's sure how to make money from it. You pay to see a movie. You watch ads on television (well, you're supposed to, unless you use TiVo). Many companies are trying to attach commercials to online videos, but the result is often extraordinarily annoying to viewers.

That's not intuitive to the broadcast folks. Depending on what country you're in, to watch free TV you'll typically watch nine to 20 minutes of commercials in order to see an hour of programming (link). That's a ratio of between 15% and 30% commercials.

Apply that same ratio to a short online video, and you're watching a 30 second commercial to see a two minute video clip. Sounds reasonable, right? It's actually borderline intolerable to viewers because it breaks the instant gratification cycle. The whole idea is to beat boredom, not generate it.

Remember, this is a new medium. It has its own rules.

Maybe the answer will be very short ads, but no one knows what's short enough, and if those short ads will even work. Or maybe the answer is putting print ads on the website alongside the video. But unlike search, you don't know what topics a video viewer will be interested in, so it's much harder to target the ads. How will you individually track the demographics of people viewing more than six million separate YouTube clips? You'd basically have to build a database on the individual thoughts and behavior of every Internet user. That, I presume, is why YouTube was a good strategic investment for Google. It's also why I'm deeply skeptical about the high-profile efforts by entertainment companies to create sites competing with YouTube. Without Google's demographic and ad-targeting infrastructure, it will be hard for a competitor to monetize its videos.

And oh by the way, it's not clear that even Google can make this whole video thing work financially.

So let's classify short online video as an emerging medium: Proven audience, unproven economics.

Video in the mobile world. This is the current Flavor of the Month in the mobile data world. (Or maybe it was last month's flavor, and this month is GPS.) Anyway, there are a lot of people predicting that video is going to be very hot in the mobile space.

As was the case with PCs, you have to ask what sort of video you're talking about. The most intuitive use is short video. We know people use mobiles as boredom-busters, and short video is almost custom-made for that. But we run into the same economic problems as we have on PCs, only more so. It's not clear how many commercials people will tolerate in their mobile video.

Broadcast video, viewed on mobiles, is becoming popular in Asia. But by my standard that's not a new medium -- it's just building a television into your phone. And it bypasses the Internet, so it's not relevant to this discussion. (I recently wrote a long article on mobile video; if you missed it you can read it here.)


Virtual Reality as a Medium: Second Life

Most people think of Second Life as a game, or maybe a cult. But my Rubicon colleague Bruce La Fetra recently wrote an article (link) making the case that it's a new medium, and I believe he's right. Think about it. Here's the test of a new medium:

--Facilitates interaction between people. Second Life certainly does that.
--Has its own distinct audience. Double check. That's why some people look at Second Life as a cult.
--Has its own economic model. Triple check. This one even has its own currency.

A virtual meeting place. Second Life is so flexible that it's very hard to say what it'll turn into ultimately. It's already a meeting space for some people, and the upcoming addition of voice should improve that dramatically. Supposedly Cisco is providing pre-built avatars for employees, and a number of tech companies are using it for meetings (check out the slightly breathless but eye-opening article here).

Second Life is a tool for holding three-dimensional visual conversations...I know some people can't hold a serious business conversation without a pen and paper to draw with; Second Life is made for those people....One day, you'll be able to import sales data from an Oracle database, create a three-dimensional diagram of that data that changes in near-realtime, and hold a meeting of top corporate executives all over the world in Second Life to discuss the results. --Mitch Wagner

Prototyping the physical world. Another clear use for VR is allowing individuals and corporations to create interactive experiences for others. For example, as Bruce points out, hotels are starting to test lobby layouts using Second Life. Brands like GeekSquad are using Second Life to reach out to customers, giving them another way to engage (read more about it here).

Some of this commentary is so enthusiastic that it reminds me of the commentary we saw in the bubble period. Second Life is definitely a geek playground, but I'm not sure how many "normal" people will want to mess around in virtual reality. We won't know until we try.

Is it a business or a standard? The ultimate business model for Second Life is still up in the air. Land owners pay real dollars for virtual real estate and corporate avatars, giving Linden Lab a revenue stream. However, the company is in the process of open-sourcing its server code. This will make it possible for anyone to create their own "land" without paying Linden Lab, and dramatically increases the likelihood that Second Life's technology will become a generalized standard for virtual reality. That's very healthy for the medium, but leaves Linden Lab without an obvious business model. There's an interesting discussion here.

The process of moving from a captive platform to the base of an open ecosystem is incredibly tricky. I think Linden is right to do it, because otherwise an open standard for virtual reality would have eventually emerged, pushing Second Life completely out of the picture (think of what happened when AOL went up against the Internet). But now Linden will need to find some parts of that open ecosystem where it can provide valued services. I think managing the virtual currency is a good start, but I haven't been able to find any clear statement of what the company's long-term financial model will be; please post a comment if you find one.

So the status of Second Life is similar to that of online video: Definite audience, unclear financials.

Virtual reality and mobile. Virtual reality thrives on large screens and fast processors. I think it's probably safe to say that it'll be limited to PC-sized devices for a long time (at least until we get flexible screens and fuel cells powerful enough to drive high-end graphics processors in a mobile). Until that day, I wouldn't be investing heavily in creating a SecondLife client for Nokia S60.


Feeds

Actually, these are several new media that I have grouped together for convenience: Text feeds, audio feeds, and video feeds. Plus more types of feeds to come.

Different feed types have different audiences. Steve Olechowski of Feedburner gives a great speech summarizing the feed world and what's happening in it. One of the interesting tidbits he gives out is that different types of feeds tend to be dominated by different subjects. Text feeds most commonly focus on technology, while audio feeds are most often about music, social issues, and religion ("Godcasts"). So different forms of communication -- text vs. recorded speech -- attract different types of creators and audiences. I suspect that video feeds are going to be different yet again, although it's probably too early to judge today. You can hear one of Steve's speeches here.

The thing I like about feeds is that they're efficient. Rather than going to a website to read or listen, you can bring the content to you and access it on your terms. A lot of people use online feed readers like Feed Burner, but my favorite is Feed Blitz, which consolidates all your feeds into a single daily e-mail. That lets me scan about a hundred articles a day in a matter of minutes.

Text feed vs. weblogs. One problem with text feeds is that they take readers away from your weblog, meaning they won't see the ads. That creates a lot of concern for weblog authors who rely on advertising. So they do things like putting only article summaries in their feeds, or embedding ads in the feeds, neither of which are popular with feed users.

Olechowski argues that authors shouldn't worry -- that the people who read feeds are different from the people who read websites, so there's little cannibalism. He says that providing a full-text feed from your weblog actually increases visitors to the site, rather than reducing them.

He has an incentive to say that, since his business is distributing feeds. But I think he may also have a point. Let's use Mobile Opportunity as an example: About 80% of the readers coming directly here are referrals from other websites and web searches, not returning readers. I think the general pattern for readers is that they come here from a web search or other link, and if they like the content then they subscribe to the feed. That's why I put extensive introductory information and links to previous articles in the sidebar on the right side of the page. If a web search visitor is interested in the sort of things I write about, I want to make sure they can determine that quickly so they'll either bookmark the page or subscribe to the feed.

The feed readers never see the sidebar, but they don't need it because they know what I've written about before. People who read via feeds have a different set of special needs. Chances are they use a feed reader that consolidates a lot of different feeds, which they then skim quickly. That makes it very important to use self-explanatory headlines for articles, and clear sub-heads within each article so people can skim easily. Web links are a special problem -- because they're colored and underlined, they stand out from the text. But they're not usually the things you want people to skim, because they don't summarize the content. That's why I've started putting links at the ends of sentences, rather than embedding them in the flow of the sentence.

I'm not trying to make money from this site, but if I were, I'd have to think very hard about what sort of ads go on the web page vs. in the feed, and where they get placed.

The bottom line: you write a little differently for a feed than you do for a weblog, and the financial model is subtly different as well. So it's a slightly different medium.

Status of feeds: Text feeds are quite well established, and audio feeds took off rapidly once they were enabled on the iPod. The financial model (to the extent that there is one) appears to be advertising, but I haven't seen a good discussion of the economics of advertising within feeds (please post a comment if you know of one). Presumably Google's recent purchase of FeedBurner is intended to allow them to stream ads into feeds, so we'll probably see more activity there. The dynamics of other types of feeds (video, etc) are still to be determined.

Feeds and the mobile world. Feeds are a spectacular fit for the mobile world; actually a much better fit than browsing. In general browsing is something you do live, while feeds can be fetched in the background, cached on the device, and then read or listened to whenever the user wishes.

A text feed is also much easier to reformat for a small screen. In a lot of ways, it's designed to be reformatted.

If I were working on a mobile data device today, I'd push this feature very hard -- figure out who my target customers are and what feeds they'd be most likely to enjoy, cache the top ten our so automatically, and give a great discovery mechanism so people can easily find more. Feeds are a commodity in that you can get them for free, but easy navigation and discovery of feeds is potentially a very attractive area for innovation.

I know third party developers are already doing this; if I were at a mobile hardware company I'd be making it a standard feature in every device.


What comes next?

What other media are emerging? Many more new forms of media emerging than I've listed here. I'm very interested in your ideas -- what do you think are some others to watch, and what's special about them? One I'd love to investigate more is the rise of casual games -- quickie games, usually based on Flash. Games like this were very popular in the early days of personal computing, and they seem to be making a comeback on the web. You can find some nifty ones on sites like Kongregate (link; check out Fancy Pants).

The transcendent need for a billing mechanism. When I said that the Web is a tool for creating new media, I left out an important detail. It's three-quarters of the tool. We have a great delivery system, and Google is well on its way to dominating the advertising part of the financial model. What's missing is a standard mechanism for people to pay for content that's not supported by advertising. Some types of content work fine with ads, but I think some other types are better when paid for. Novels, short stories, music, and research reports all qualify. Creators and readers would both benefit from a system in which people could easily pay a few dimes or a few dollars directly to the author, but today we generally have to fumble with credit cards and awkward systems like PayPal. And credit card vendors strongly discourage small payments.

Minipayments vs. micropayments. The Web community chewed over this issue and spat it out several years ago. They believe that micropayments are dead, and the subject is closed. You can find examples here and here and here and here. Wikipedia has a nicely balanced discussion of the debate here.

This is one of those cases where the groupthink tendency of the tech industry is a liability. It reminds me of MP3 players before the iPod -- a lot of people have tried something, nobody's gotten it right yet, and therefore it must be impossible. It'll continue to be impossible up until someone does it right, at which time everyone will suddenly agree that it was inevitable.

(Quick aside: Whenever everyone in the tech industry agrees on something, bet against them. A perfect consensus is a sign that healthy questioning has ceased, and there's bound to be a blind spot.)

In this case, I think the blind spot was that people predicted the wrong role and features for micropayments. Some people made it a payment vs. advertising debate (link). It's not -- some types of media are good for advertising, some good for payment. We need both, with a creative tension between them.

Another problem is that some of the advocates of micropayments envisioned a very fine-grained payment system, in which people would pay hundredths of cents for all sorts of content, like the way natural gas or water is metered. That sounded logical, but it didn't work in practice because gas and water are predictable commodities; you don't mind metering because you know exactly what you'll get. You don't know how good a website will be until you've visited it, by which point you have already paid if you're metering. We need larger payments for content that people can preview and read reviews about before they pay. Apple has proved decisively that on the wired Internet a payment system that charges about a buck for discrete chunks of content can indeed succeed.

Call it minipayments.

We desperately need a generalized minipayment system for content on the web. Because people have to trust it, it needs to come from a major vendor, and it should be exposed to developers as a web service so it can grow rapidly. Ideally, it should be tied to a lot of existing content with an easy discovery mechanism (again, like iTunes). Yahoo would be the perfect company to provide this service. Microsoft could do it too. Unfortunately, a lot of companies are focusing a huge amount of their energy on the almost hopeless task of beating Google in search advertising, when the better opportunity is owning a different piece of the infrastructure, one that doesn't have a dominant vendor yet.

Other companies that could do it include Amazon, Apple, eBay, and even Linden Lab. Google could do it too, of course, but it appears to be more interested in stealing PayPal's customers than in building something new.

I'd put this service on the list of computing products I want desperately, right after the info pad. Somebody's going to do it eventually. When they do they'll get a great business franchise, and the explosion of new media on the Web will accelerate even further.

I can't wait.

Next time: The Web as a software development platform.

Why is Apple porting its browser to Windows? To take over the world, of course.

There are so many interesting things going on in the industry that it's frustrating, because I don't have time to write about them all.

Jerry Yang is now in charge at Yahoo, which in my opinion means a lot because a founder is often much more willing to revisit old assumptions and make radical changes than is someone who came in after the fact. (I know the stereotype is that founders resist change, but I've found that the exact opposite is often true, especially if the founder is moving up after spending time lower in the management chain.)

Google bought Grand Central, which underlines their interest in providing client software for mobile phones. It's a significant change for Google because up to now they have focused mostly on providing mobile versions of their existing web apps, like Maps. Grand Central is different; it's a call management system that embeds Google deeply in the life of a mobile user. It implies a much tighter relationship between Google and the user than most other Google products, and it's not something that you can easily monetize through advertising -- which makes me wonder whether Google is planning to run it standalone or integrate it into something bigger.

But the strangest recent development was Apple's decision to port its Safari web browser to Windows.

It is not easy to port a browser to a new platform. There's a huge amount of programming involved -- to do the actual port, to debug it, and to maintain and upgrade the code as people identify small incompatibilities and ask for new features. I lived through PalmSource's effort to get a good browser for Palm OS, and talked with the Be veterans about their browser work. The quick summary: it's a huge pain in the butt.

What's Apple hoping to get? The engineers at Apple who are spending their time on Safari for Windows could be creating new features for the iPhone, or helping to finish the next version of Mac OS X. Although Apple is rich enough to hire a lot of engineers, the supply of really good ones is limited, so Apple's definitely paying a price to do the port. And for what? To get people to use an alternate browser, you have to give it away for free. So there's no immediate benefit to doing the port.

A lot of Apple enthusiast sites have asked what's going on, but I'm not persuaded by most of the answers they came up with. For example, a site called Apple Matters gave four possible motivations: for bragging rights, to show Windows users what it's like to use a Mac, to give iPhone website developers a tool to test their sites, and to get revenue from search referrals to Yahoo and Google (link).

Apple Matters seems like a very good site, and to give them credit, even they were skeptical about some of the possible explanations. None of them work for me. Apple doesn't need more bragging rights, a browser is a very awkward way to show off the Mac UI, iPhone developers can buy an iPhone to test their sites, and the search referral fees from Yahoo and Google can't be all that big or everyone would be writing browsers.

I think the motivation runs deeper. It turns out that Apple didn't just port the browser to Windows; it ported the browser, the underlying Web rendering engine, and the Mac OS X programming frameworks that the browser relies on. In other words, Apple ported an entire OS layer onto Windows, and the browser is riding on top of that (link).

Now that's interesting. Apple is backing into the cross-platform OS layer business. Maybe the OS layer is just a convenient way to do the browser port. Or maybe the browser is just a trojan horse to get the OS layer on a lot more systems.

Add to this situation Apple's other recent strange announcement -- that it's "enabling" iPhone applications development by supporting Ajax web software on the iPhone. The problem with Ajax/Web2 applications is that they rely on a constant network connection in order to work. They're just thin clients to a server on the Web. Considering the iPhone's lack of true 3G connection speed, and AT&T/Cingular's well-documented data coverage limitations, Ajax-style development is about the worst thing you could do on the iPhone. What the developers wanted was the ability to create native Mac OS X applications, and Apple blew them off.

Why piss off the developers, and why put such a huge handicap on people supporting your critical new product?

Maybe the iPhone is so screwed up internally that it can't support third party apps. Sure, and maybe Apple wants to port Safari to Windows just for ego.

If you want a single idea that explains both actions, it's this: Apple realizes that in the long term, the development platform that matters is not the OS on the hardware, but the software layer that the web apps run on (I believe that; you can read more here). Apple realizes that this layer will eventually become good enough to displace native personal computer apps. Web apps then become both an opportunity and a challenge for Apple. The opportunity is that they're a way to take down Microsoft. The challenge is that the same process that obsoletes Windows obsoletes other PC operating systems, including Mac OS.

This makes it vital for Apple to create its own Web apps layer, so it can control its own destiny and increase its power. That goal would be so important that Apple would be willing to handicap iPhone apps development in the short term in order to make developers focus on the web apps platform in the long term.

If that's Apple's thinking, then the next thing to watch for will be Apple gradually adding more features to its OS layer, in the guise of browser APIs and feature enhancements. Those features will be deployed at the same time on the Mac, the iPhone, and Windows Safari. And Apple will start evangelizing web app developers to use them.

The war to come. This could set up a brutal competition in software layers, between Adobe Apollo, Microsoft Silverlight, Sun's revised Java, Firefox's platform, and Apple. Google fits in there somewhere as well, but it's not clear if they'll try to create their own platform or work with several other players.

I think this is where the most interesting action's going to be in applications development in the next few years. Stay tuned.

Why Web 2.0 still doesn't cut it for mobile devices

About a year ago, I wrote an article on "why Web 2.0 doesn't cut it for mobile devices." My basic argument was that because wireless web connections are intermittent and unreliable, a completely thin client architecture for applications won't work. (A thin client application is one in which the code for the app stays on a server, and all you have on your PC or mobile device is a little user interface widget. Every time you do something with the web app, your device has to talk to the server. Almost all web 2.0 apps are thin client apps.)

So here I am riding the BART train out of San Francisco, after spending the day at the Web 2 Expo. I'm using a Pantech/Sprint EVDO card in my computer, which gives the rough equivalent of low-speed DSL connectivity all over the city. Even though it cuts my notebook's battery life in half, I still think it's cool as ice cream in July.

Anyway, I'm having a good time working on a couple of blog posts, using the thin client Blogger interface, when the train goes through a tunnel. Guess what, no connection. Then we come out of the tunnel at a station, and my connection comes back for 30 seconds. Quick! Load that page! Then we go back into the tunnel again. And on, and on, and on.

Think of it as Bloggus Interruptus.

I guess I could ding Sprint for failing to extend its network to the subway tunnels, but this sort of problem is ubiquitous around the world for high-speed data networks. They have much less coverage than the voice networks, and that's changing only gradually. Even as we get more coverage, it won't be possible to depend on always having the connection when you need it.

The way mobile web apps need to work is that they download the full app and a copy of your data to your device, so you can work independently. Then in the background, they should sync the data whenever you're connected. That's how RIM's e-mail works, and it's still the state of the art for giving you the illusion of always-on wireless connectivity even though there's no such thing in the real world.

Going to Web 2 Expo

I'm going to Web 2 Expo in San Francisco this week. If you're attending and want to chat, please drop me an e-mail here.

If you're not going, I'll post a note on what I see at the show.

An early look at the ultimate social networking tool

For several weeks I've been in a private beta test of a new social networking service designed to help mobile and PC users keep in touch and share ideas. I think it's the sexiest new product I've seen since the Nokia 7650, and even though it's still in early beta I want to talk about it.

I promised not to describe some of the details of their implementation, because the patents haven't all been filed, so I apologize in advance that I'll have to leave some blanks. But here goes...

The company, Inrvoice LLC, has great credentials -- it was founded by former engineers from Netscape and RIM, who teamed up with a group of biomedical researchers from UC San Francisco. It's funded by a consortium of A-list VCs from Stockholm and Palo Alto. That in itself is unusual -- usually startups like this are funded only in one region. But I think the cross-cultural aspect of the service make its appeal universal.

The folks at Inrvoice are targeting one of the key drawbacks of today's social networking software -- the need to type ideas and comments in order to share them with others. Instead, Inrvoice's software directly captures the thoughts of users, as they happen, and shares them automatically with everyone in the user's social network.

I'm not allowed to give all the details of the process, but suffice it to say that it involves Bluetooth wireless, the user swallowing a small sensor pill, and one of the first commercial deployments of nanomachines that I've heard of.

The product is called Spitr, and I'm sure you'll be hearing a lot more about it in the weeks to come.



Spitr's ability to share thoughts rather than typed words dramatically increases the efficiency and richness of interactions on social networks. No longer do you have to guess what one of your friends might be thinking on a moment to moment basis; no longer do you miss out on nuances or ideas that they might not normally have time to share.

As an example of Spitr's power, here's a real Spew (the company's term for a transcript of a user's thoughts). I've been asked not to give the user's name, but I can tell you that he/she is a blogger and executive at a major Web company, attending a recent conference:
11:45:39 i wonder if there are any new comments on my blog
11:45:44 huh, the next speaker is making a web service that recycles composted kitchen waste
11:45:47 i dont get it. who eats at home anymore
11:45:49 when the hell is the lunch break
11:45:48 this company doesnt make sense to me but arrington likes it so i should invest
11:45:53 i wonder if there are any new comments on my blog
11:45:57 damn my new shoes look cool
11:46:03 hey what the hell was that. did something bite me or did i just sit on a tack. wait if i grab my butt i'll look stupid. dont move
11:46:07 ow ow ow it really hurts
11:46:01 dont move dont move
11:46:04 maybe if i pretend to adjust my sock i can lean over and
11:46:07 ahhh much better
11:46:08 damn i sat on my usb drive. hope i didn't break another one
11:46:10 is that guy still talking about kitchen waste
11:46:12 tim looks really good in that jacket
11:46:15 i wonder if there are any new comments on my blog

Currently, Spitr Spews are only one-way: the user's thoughts are transcribed and sent in writing to other members, who read them on their PC or mobile phone. The company is working on two-way Spews which transfer thoughts directly between the minds of recipients, but needs to do more work before it turns on the feature. In an early two-way test, the thoughts of Steve Ballmer and Eric Schmidt were accidentally linked in a single session, producing a destructive feedback loop that took down Sprint's EVDO data network for twenty minutes. The company is confident that new filtering software can prevent those loops in the future.

Even in its one-way mode, Spitr makes an incredible improvement in the frequency and detail of social messaging. But once it becomes two-way, it'll really take off. I think some of the most promising usages are:

Workgroup collaboration. A work team in a company could be continuously linked to one-another in a two-way Spew. The effect would be like a continuous staff meeting 24/7, but removing all remaining illusions that people might actually be paying attention.

International understanding. Another exciting aspect of Spitr is that the company is exposing an API to the service, enabling others to create mash-ups of Spitr with additional web services. One of the first mashups has combined Spitr with BabelFish to produce BabelSpit, which produces instant translation of a user's thoughts into six different languages. Here's the translated Spew from a Japanese tech executive attending that same recent conference:

11:45:33 As for me it is not possible to believe those which these people make their kitchen scraps.
11:45:42 I putting, tonight it is possible to be able, whether or not you think in doubt.
11:45:48 I me Tokyo yakitori which is eaten and desire the fact that it returns to the beer which is drunk.
11:45:57 As for me it is necessary to arrange the hair of my ear.
11:46:07 That man is he grabbing his underside?
11:46:12 Whether or not there is new comment in my blog, I think.

Spitr's potential impact on international communication is obvious.

Celebrity interest groups. Fans of a celebrity could subscribe to a one-way Spew feed (a "Spweed") to monitor the thoughts of celebrities throughout the day. Inrvoice hasn't yet disclosed its financial model, but I believe this is how it will monetize the service. Imagine how much fans would pay to track Paris Hilton as she tries to remember whether she has a valid driver's license, or Britney Spears as she ponders the underwear yes/no question.

I think that's just the start, though. Every Spitr account automatically generates a Spew feed, giving each and every one of us the opportunity to auction off the last shreds of our privacy and create a circle of obsessive admirers. This is the ultimate evolution of social networking, and I expect to see Spweeds pop up rapidly on MySpace and weblog sidebars.

Biometric sharing. Since they're already placing sensors in the body, an obvious next step for Inrvoice is to add biometric data to the Spew feed. That's apparently what the company is planning, judging from the screen shot below that I found on a bulletin board:



One application of this could be to help a social group of teenage girls plan a shared trip to the bathroom.

I think this is a very powerful and extensible feature. Picture the company pairing the biometric data with the GPS in your mobile to deliver customized location-aware services. For example, you could configure your phone to automatically order a pizza delivered to your location whenever you reach a certain hunger level. Or you could scan a dance club for people with compatible levels of libido and blood alcohol.

The possibilities are endless.

Implications for the industry. I'll be interested to see how the Spitr service develops over time. There are sure to be efforts at clones from other companies, although the Inrvoice folks seem to be pretty confident that their patents will hold up. Google and Microsoft would obviously be interested, if only for the possibility of slipping ads directly into the thought streams of users. And I think it would be interesting to see what Apple would do with it, especially since Mac owners are already close to a group entity.

I'm sure we'll know more by the next time April first rolls around.